Monday, June 1, 2026

Codifying Human Dignity: A Comparative Study of the Right to Life from the Magna Carta to the Constitutions of India and Sri Lanka

 


The evolution of fundamental rights from medieval concessions to universal, enforceable constitutional guarantees represents one of the most profound developments in legal history. Tracing this trajectory from the Magna Carta to modern frameworks—such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the constitutions of India and Sri Lanka—reveals a continuous struggle to codify human dignity and protect it from arbitrary state power.

Below is a comparative analysis examining these four foundational pillars, with a specific focus on how the right to life has been articulated, expanded, or—in the case of Sri Lanka—conspicuously omitted, and how the judiciary navigates these texts.

I. The Magna Carta (1215): The Genesis of the Rule of Law

The Magna Carta, sealed by King John at Runnymede, was not originally conceived as a universal human rights document, but rather as a peace treaty between a despotic monarch and rebellious barons. However, its historical and philosophical value far exceeds its original intent.

The document's profound contribution to legal philosophy lies in the principle that the sovereign is not above the law.

  • Due Process and Liberty: Clause 39 established the bedrock of due process, stating that no free man shall be seized, imprisoned, or stripped of his rights except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.

  • Access to Justice: Clause 40 declared, "To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice."

While the Magna Carta did not explicitly outline a "right to life" in modern terms, its insistence on lawful procedure before a person could be destroyed or imprisoned laid the groundwork for the writ of habeas corpus. It birthed the concept that individual liberty can only be curtailed through transparent, established legal mechanisms.

II. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): The Global Standard

Drafted in the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II, the UDHR shifted the paradigm of rights from domestic concessions to universal, inalienable entitlements held simply by virtue of being human.

  • The Right to Life: The UDHR explicitly elevates the right to life to the forefront of human rights discourse. Article 3 states unequivocally: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."

  • Interdependence of Rights: The UDHR structurally intertwines the right to life with freedom from torture (Article 5) and equality before the law (Article 7).

The UDHR established the normative baseline that life is not merely a biological state to be protected from state execution, but a foundational right required to enjoy all subsequent civil, political, economic, and cultural rights.

III. The Constitution of India (1950): Expansive Jurisprudence

The framers of the Indian Constitution, deeply influenced by the UDHR, embedded a comprehensive Bill of Rights within Part III of the Constitution. Article 21 explicitly guarantees the right to life: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

The true power of the Indian constitutional framework lies in the Supreme Court's expansive, activist interpretation of Article 21, shifting from a narrow textual reading to a broad doctrine of human dignity.

Key Case Studies in India

1. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

When Maneka Gandhi’s passport was impounded by the government "in public interest" without a hearing, the Supreme Court revolutionized constitutional law. The Court ruled that the "procedure established by law" in Article 21 cannot be arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable. This judgment intertwined Article 21 (Life and Liberty) with Article 14 (Equality), transforming Article 21 into a powerful mandate for substantive due process.

2. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985)

When the state government sought to evict pavement dwellers in Bombay without providing alternative housing, the Supreme Court held that the right to life under Article 21 is not limited to mere biological existence but encompasses the right to livelihood. The Court reasoned that depriving a person of their means of living is tantamount to depriving them of life itself, firmly establishing socio-economic rights within the explicitly codified right to life.

IV. The Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978): The Lacuna of the Right to Life

In contrast to India, the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1978) presents a unique constitutional architecture. Chapter III guarantees a robust set of rights, including freedom from torture (Article 11), equality before the law (Article 12), and freedom from arbitrary arrest (Article 13). However, the explicit "Right to Life" is structurally absent.

Because the text lacks an explicit equivalent to India's Article 21, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has had to engage in highly creative jurisprudence to read an implied right to life into the Constitution, particularly in cases of state violence.

Key Case Studies in Sri Lanka

1. Sriyani Silva v. Iddamalgoda (2003)

Jagath Kumara was tortured to death in police custody. Because he was dead, the state argued his fundamental rights were extinguished and his widow had no standing (locus standi) to sue. Justice Mark Fernando delivered a landmark judgment, ruling that although the right to life is not expressly recognized, it is impliedly recognized in Article 13(4) (regulating the death penalty) and Article 11 (freedom from torture). The Court reasoned that unlawfully depriving a person of life is the ultimate form of torture. This established that next-of-kin can sue the state for custodial deaths.

2. Fathima Sharmila v. Officer in Charge, Slave Island (2023)

Following the extrajudicial killing of a suspect in police custody, the Supreme Court expanded on the Sriyani Silva precedent. Scrutinizing the police narrative, the Court explicitly referenced international obligations to supplement the domestic gap, stating: "The prevention of extra-judicial killings or custodial deaths invites raising the domestic standards to meet international obligations in upholding the inviolability of life." This highlights the ongoing necessity for the judiciary to build legal bridges to protect citizens from state violence in the absence of a codified right.

V. Comparative Synthesis

Magna Carta (England)
1215

Established that state power is limited by the law of the land; introduced due process.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN)
1948

Codified the right to life globally (Article 3) as inherent and inalienable.

Constitution of India
1950

Enshrined the right to life (Article 21), later expanded by courts to mean "life with human dignity" and the "right to livelihood."

Constitution of Sri Lanka
1978

Enacted Chapter III Fundamental Rights, but omitted an explicit right to life, relying instead on implied judicial interpretations for custodial deaths.

The table below illustrates how the core concepts of human dignity are handled across the four texts:

ConceptMagna Carta (1215)UDHR (1948)India (1950)Sri Lanka (1978)
Right to LifeImplicit (protection from unlawful destruction)Explicit (Article 3)Explicit (Article 21)Implied (Read by courts into Articles 11 & 13)
Due ProcessClause 39 ("lawful judgment of his equals")Articles 9 & 10Articles 21 & 22Article 13
Judicial ApproachRestraining arbitrary monarchical powerNormative international standardProactive expansion of rights for the livingRetrospective compensation for the deceased

VI. Conclusion

The trajectory of human rights from the Magna Carta to modern constitutionalism demonstrates a steady march toward the explicit codification of human dignity. The Indian cases, such as Maneka Gandhi and Olga Tellis, demonstrate what is possible when the right to life is explicitly codified: the judiciary can proactively expand it to cover livelihood, dignity, and socio-economic fairness.

Sri Lanka stands at a constitutional crossroads. While its courts have brilliantly constructed workarounds in cases like Sriyani Silva and Fathima Sharmila, these remain reactive measures—primarily utilized to offer retrospective compensation for state-sanctioned violence rather than expanding protections for the living. Until the right to life is formally codified, Sri Lanka's fundamental rights chapter remains an incomplete reflection of the universal standards envisioned in 1948, leaving its jurisprudence overly reliant on judicial implication rather than constitutional guarantee.

References

  • United Nations General Assembly. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights (217 [III] A). Paris.

  • The Constitution of India. (1950). Part III: Fundamental Rights (Articles 12-35).

  • The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. (1978). Chapter III: Fundamental Rights.

  • Supreme Court of India. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.

  • Supreme Court of India. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180.

  • Supreme Court of India. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

  • Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. Sriyani Silva v. Iddamalgoda, [2003] 1 Sri LR 14.

  • Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. Fathima Sharmila v. Officer in Charge, Slave Island, SC/FR/398/2008 (Judgment delivered in 2023).

  • Rule of Law Education Centre. Magna Carta and Human Rights.

  • Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA). (2022). Human Rights and Democracy in Sri Lanka. Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Right to Life, Constitutional Law, Fundamental Rights, Magna Carta, Sri Lanka Law, Comparative Law, UDHR.


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