The Missing Pillar: Tracing the Right to Life through Global Frameworks and its Constitutional Lacuna in Sri Lanka

 

The evolution of fundamental rights from medieval concessions to universal, enforceable constitutional guarantees represents one of the most profound developments in legal history. Tracing this trajectory from the Magna Carta to modern frameworks—such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the constitutions of India and Sri Lanka—reveals a continuous struggle to codify human dignity and protect it from arbitrary state power.

Below is a comparative analysis examining these four foundational pillars, with a specific focus on how the right to life has been articulated, expanded, or—in the case of Sri Lanka—conspicuously omitted.

I. The Magna Carta (1215): The Genesis of the Rule of Law

The Magna Carta, sealed by King John at Runnymede, was not originally conceived as a universal human rights document, but rather as a peace treaty between a despotic monarch and rebellious barons. However, its historical and philosophical value far exceeds its original intent.

The document's profound contribution to legal philosophy lies in the principle that the sovereign is not above the law.

• Due Process and Liberty: Clause 39 established the bedrock of due process, stating that no free man shall be seized, imprisoned, or stripped of his rights except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.

• Access to Justice: Clause 40 declared, "To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice."

While the Magna Carta did not explicitly outline a "right to life" in modern terms, its insistence on lawful procedure before a person could be destroyed or imprisoned laid the groundwork for the writ of habeas corpus. It birthed the concept that individual liberty can only be curtailed through transparent, established legal mechanisms.

II. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): The Global Standard

Eleanor Roosevelt famously referred to the UDHR as the "international Magna Carta of all men everywhere." Drafted in the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II, the UDHR shifted the paradigm of rights from domestic concessions to universal, inalienable entitlements held simply by virtue of being human.

• The Right to Life: The UDHR explicitly elevates the right to life to the forefront of human rights discourse. Article 3 states unequivocally: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."

• Interdependence of Rights: The UDHR structurally intertwines the right to life with freedom from torture (Article 5) and equality before the law (Article 7).

The UDHR established the normative baseline that life is not merely a biological state to be protected from state execution, but a foundational right required to enjoy all subsequent civil, political, economic, and cultural rights.

III. The Constitution of India (1950): Expansive Jurisprudence

The framers of the Indian Constitution, deeply influenced by the UDHR, embedded a comprehensive Bill of Rights within Part III of the Constitution, often referred to as the Magna Carta of India.

• Explicit Codification: Article 21 explicitly guarantees the right to life: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

• Judicial Expansion: The true power of the Indian constitutional framework lies in the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of Article 21. Beginning with Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Court ruled that "procedure established by law" must be just, fair, and reasonable.

Over decades, the Indian judiciary has ruled that the "right to life" is not merely the right to animal existence, but the right to live with human dignity. Through this single article, the Court has read into the Constitution the right to a clean environment, the right to privacy (Puttaswamy v. Union of India), the right to livelihood, and the right to health.

IV. The Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978): The Lacuna of the Right to Life

In contrast to the UDHR and the Indian Constitution, the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1978) presents a unique and problematic constitutional architecture regarding fundamental rights.

Chapter III of the Sri Lankan Constitution guarantees a robust set of rights, including freedom of thought and religion (Article 10), freedom from torture (Article 11), equality before the law (Article 12), and freedom from arbitrary arrest (Article 13). However, the explicit "Right to Life" is structurally absent.

The Current Legal Reality in Sri Lanka

As of today, despite numerous constitutional amendments, the right to life has not yet been explicitly codified into the constitutional text. This creates a significant legal vulnerability:

1. Judicial Workarounds: The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has had to creatively read an implicit right to life into other provisions. In the landmark case of Sriyani Silva v. Iddamalgoda (2003), the Court reasoned that since Article 11 protects against torture and Article 13(4) regulates the death penalty, the Constitution must implicitly recognize the right to life. After all, one cannot be tortured to death without violating Article 11.

2. The Danger of Implication: While judicial activism has provided a safety net, an implied right is inherently weaker than an expressed one. Without an explicit Article guaranteeing life and dignity, Sri Lankan courts lack the broad constitutional mandate enjoyed by Indian courts to expand protections into areas like healthcare, environmental justice, and livelihood.

3. International Incongruence: The lack of an explicit right to life places the Sri Lankan Constitution out of sync with its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Sri Lanka has ratified, and the broader UDHR framework.

V. Comparative Synthesis

1215: Magna Carta

England

Established that state power is limited by the law of the land; introduced due process.

1948: Universal Declaration of Human Rights

United Nations

Codified the right to life globally (Article 3) as inherent and inalienable.

1950: Constitution of India

India

Enshrined the right to life (Article 21), later expanded by courts to mean "life with human dignity."

1978: Constitution of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka

Enacted Chapter III Fundamental Rights, but notably omitted an explicit right to life, relying instead on implied judicial interpretations.

The table below illustrates how the core concepts of human dignity are handled across the four texts:

Concept	Magna Carta (1215)	UDHR (1948)	India (1950)	Sri Lanka (1978)
Right to Life	Implicit (protection from unlawful destruction)	Explicit (Article 3)	Explicit (Article 21)	Not explicitly included; read implicitly by courts into Articles 11 & 13
Due Process	Clause 39 ("lawful judgment of his equals")	Articles 9 & 10	Articles 21 & 22	Article 13
Equality	Limited to "free men"	Articles 1 & 7	Article 14	Article 12

VI. Conclusion

The trajectory of human rights from the Magna Carta to modern constitutionalism demonstrates a steady march toward the explicit codification of human dignity. The Magna Carta established the mechanics of legal restraint; the UDHR universalized the philosophy of inherent rights; and the Indian Constitution demonstrated how an explicit right to life can be wielded as an evolving tool for social justice.

Sri Lanka stands at a constitutional crossroads. While its Constitution provides strong procedural safeguards against state overreach (such as arbitrary arrest and torture), the continued absence of an explicit Right to Life remains a critical doctrinal gap. Until this right is formally codified, Sri Lanka's fundamental rights chapter remains an incomplete reflection of the universal standards envisioned in 1948.

References

• United Nations General Assembly. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights (217 [III] A). Paris.

• The Constitution of India. (1950). Part III: Fundamental Rights (Articles 12-35).

• The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. (1978). Chapter III: Fundamental Rights.

• Supreme Court of India. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597. (Establishing the broad interpretation of Article 21).

• Supreme Court of India. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

• Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. Sriyani Silva v. Iddamalgoda, [2003] 1 Sri LR 14. (Recognizing an implied right to life via Article 11).

• Rule of Law Education Centre. Magna Carta and Human Rights. (Tracing the legacy of clauses 39 and 40 into modern international law).

• Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA). (2022). Human Rights and Democracy in Sri Lanka. Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Right to Life, Constitutional Law, Fundamental Rights, Magna Carta, Sri Lanka Law, Comparative Law, UDHR.

The Neurojurisprudence of Cognitive Control: The Role of the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex in Legal Reasoning, Culpability, and Evidentiary Admissibility

 

Abstract The intersection of cognitive neuroscience and jurisprudence—often termed "neurolaw"—has increasingly focused on the neuroanatomical substrates of human behavior to explain legal constructs such as culpability, moral reasoning, and judicial decision-making. Central to this inquiry is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), a critical node in the brain's executive functioning network responsible for cognitive control, impulse regulation, and the enforcement of social norms. This article examines the jurisprudential implications of dlPFC functioning, particularly regarding third-party punishment and mens rea. Furthermore, it evaluates how neuroscientific data, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), is currently utilized and admitted as evidence in courts to determine diminished capacity and inform sentencing guidelines.

1. Introduction

Modern jurisprudence relies heavily on the presumption of rational agency. The legal constructs of contractual capacity, criminal responsibility, and objective judicial reasoning all presume an actor capable of weighing consequences, understanding normative rules, and controlling limbic impulses. Advancements in cognitive neuroscience demonstrate that these capacities are heavily dependent on the functional integrity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). The dlPFC dynamically contributes to cognitive control, goal-directed behaviors, and the implementation of social norms (Yoder & Decety, 2017). Consequently, abnormalities or dysfunctions in this region have profound implications for how the legal system assesses blameworthiness and administers justice.

2. The dlPFC and Third-Party Punishment

One of the most direct applications of dlPFC functioning in jurisprudence is the study of "third-party punishment"—the mechanism by which judges, juries, and society penalize transgressors. Third-party bystanders engage in punishment to enforce norms and reduce inequity, a process that requires overriding purely egocentric or emotional responses (Feng et al., 2023).

Neurocomputational models reveal that while regions like the anterior insula and the amygdala drive the emotional aversion to a norm violation, the dlPFC mediates the cognitive control required to administer costly punishment and regulate these emotional responses (Feng et al., 2023). The dlPFC allows a trier of fact to integrate the harm caused by an offense with the offender's specific intent, overriding raw emotional vengeance to apply proportional, standardized legal sanctions. Thus, the jurisprudential ideal of the impartial judge actively relies on optimized dlPFC functioning to suppress heuristic biases and adhere to strict standards of proof.

3. Mens Rea, Culpability, and Moral Agency

Criminal liability fundamentally requires both the guilty act (actus reus) and the guilty mind (mens rea). The capacity to form specific intent and align one's behavior with legal statutes is a core executive function. Research utilizing machine learning and fMRI has even begun to distinguish between subtle legal gradients of mens rea, such as the distinction between "knowing" and "reckless" mental states, highlighting distinct neural activations in regions including the dlPFC (Vilares et al., 2017).

When evaluating culpability, particularly in the context of antisocial behavior and psychopathy, moral neuroscience has clear forensic implications. The disruption of functional connectivity in networks underlying social decision-making, including the dlPFC and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, is frequently utilized as part of mens rea defenses (Yoder & Decety, 2017). If a defendant's dlPFC is structurally or functionally impaired—due to trauma, tumors, or delayed myelination in juveniles—their capacity to exercise volition and foresee legal consequences is severely diminished.

4. The Admissibility of Neuroscientific Evidence in Courts

The translation of these neuroscientific insights into the courtroom presents both opportunities and epistemological challenges. Neuroanatomical abnormalities and functional neuroimaging evidence (e.g., fMRI, PET scans) are increasingly offered by defense attorneys to suggest that defendants lack the capacity to understand right from wrong, thereby attempting to mitigate culpability (Yoder & Decety, 2017).

A. Evidentiary Standards and Admissibility

The admissibility of neuroevidence typically falls under established legal standards for expert testimony, such as the Daubert standard in the United States, which requires scientific evidence to be testable, peer-reviewed, and generally accepted. Neuroimaging is most successfully admitted during the sentencing phase rather than the guilt phase. Because the evidentiary burden is lower during sentencing, brain scans demonstrating dlPFC dysfunction are frequently introduced as mitigating factors to argue against capital punishment or maximum sentences.

B. Diminished Capacity and the Insanity Defense

In cases invoking the insanity defense or diminished capacity, neuroscientific evidence is used to corroborate standardized psychiatric assessments. For example, evidence of brain damage affecting cognitive control networks is used to argue that a defendant's brain is abnormal in a way that inherently reduces their legal culpability (Yoder & Decety, 2017). However, courts remain cautious of the "inferential leap" from a structural brain abnormality to a definitive lack of legal volition at the exact moment a crime was committed.

C. Neuroprediction and Risk Assessment

A frontier in the evidentiary use of neuroscience is "neuroprediction"—the attempt to use neuroimaging to prospectively identify individuals predisposed to violence or recidivism (Poldrack et al., 2017). While behavioral prediction has a fraught history in law, the integration of neuroscientific markers into risk assessment algorithms is being explored for guiding decisions on bail, parole, and civil commitment (Poldrack et al., 2017). However, utilizing biological data to predict future criminality raises profound bioethical and constitutional concerns regarding mental privacy and determinism.

5. Conclusion

The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is the biological nexus of legal responsibility. As cognitive neuroscience continues to map the pathways of impulse control and moral reasoning, jurisprudence must adapt its classical models of the "rational actor." While fMRI and neuroscientific data are increasingly prevalent as evidentiary tools for mitigation and proving diminished capacity, the legal system must critically evaluate the epistemological limits of this technology. Integrating neuroscientific evidence into courtrooms necessitates a rigorous, rights-based approach to ensure it advances justice without reducing human agency to mere neurobiology.

References

Feng, C., Tian, X., & Luo, Y.-J. (2023). Neurocomputational substrates underlying the effect of identifiability on third-party punishment. The Journal of Neuroscience, 43(47), 8018–8031. https://doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.0460-23.2023 Cited by: 13

Poldrack, R., Monahan, J., Imrey, P., Reyna, V., Raichle, M., Faigman, D., & Buckholtz, J. (2017). Predicting violent behavior: What can neuroscience add? https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/ba3du Cited by: 157

Vilares, I., Wesley, M. J., Ahn, W.-Y., Bonnie, R. J., Hoffman, M., Jones, O. D., Morse, S. J., Yaffe, G., Lohrenz, T., & Montague, P. R. (2017). Predicting the knowledge–recklessness distinction in the human brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(12), 3222–3227. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1619385114 Cited by: 63

Yoder, K. J., & Decety, J. (2017). The neuroscience of morality and social decision-making. Psychology, Crime & Law, 24(3), 279–295. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316x.2017.1414817 Cited by: 152